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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COMPENSABILITY OF INJURIES REsULTING
FROM PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS-Plaintiff, a dairy worker, suffered an infection in her left arm as a result of submitting to a Wassermann test as
ordered by her employer. The county board of health required dairy
workers to take the test as a condition of their employment and the order
was issued in pursuance -thereof. Plaintiff filed a claim for compensation
under the state Workmen's Compensation Act1 which was rejected by
her employer but sustained upon a hearing before the state commission.
Defendant's exceptions were overruled on appeal to the superior court.
On appeal to the supreme court, held, reversed. The injury did not arise
out of and in •the course of the employment and therefore is not compensable under the act. King v. Arthur, 245 N.C. 599, 96 S.E. (2d) 846
(1957).
Under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, an injury, to be compensable, must have arisen out of and in the course of the employment.2 In
the case of an injury resulting from an examination which is required or
requested by the employer, the origin of the impetus for the examination
seems to be the decisive factor in determining if this requirement is met.3
If the employer, of his own volition, orders or requests his employees to
submit to an examination, an injury resulting therefrom is compensable.4

1 N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §97-2(£).
· 2See 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION I.Aw §6.00, p. 41 (1952).
3 E.g., Industrial Commission v. Messinger, 116 Colo. 451, 181 P. (2d) 816 (1947);
Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, 206 S.C. 103, 33 S.E. (2d) 81 (1945).
4 Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, note 3 supra; Sanders v. Children's Aid Society, 238
App. Div. 746, 265 N.Y.S. 698 (1933); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Mitchell,
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If, however, the employer merely acts in pursuance of a public law or at

the request of a public authority, the courts generally hold that resulting
injuries are not compensable.5 The reasoning of the courts is that if the
examination is at the instance of the employer, it is then a precautionary
measure serving his interests and is therefore activity in the course of the
employment. On the other hand, if the impetus for the examination comes
from a public law or authority, the examination is solely for the benefit
of the general public and thus devoid of any connection with the employment. 6 The principal case is in line with the authorities in that the employer ordered his employees to take the Wassermann test only because
a regulation of the board of health required him to do so. However,
application of this "original impetus" test to determine compensability
seems unjustifiable. It is not uncommon for a state to require various precautionary measures of employers engaged in activities that may endanger
the general public if a high degree of care is not exercised. In effect, the
state is expanding the scope of the employer's activities in the interest of
public welfare as a valid exercise of its police powers. Accordingly, a
more realistic test would be to determine if the examination is occasioned
by the particular type of work done, or merely by the fact that the employee
is a member of the general public. For example, if a board of health, in its
quest to have the general public examined, requests employers to have
their employees cooperate, a resulting injury would not be compensable.7
In such case, the examination is not prompted by the type of work in which
the employee is engaged, but rather by the fact that he is merely a member

(Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 27 S.W. (2d) 600. See Saintsing v. Steinbach Co., 1 N.J.S. 259, 64 A.
(2d) 99 (1949), and Smith v. Brown Paper Mill Co., (La. App. 1934) 152 S. 700, where
the courts held that mere urging by the employer was sufficient to link the examination
with the employment since this was coupled with the fact the employer would be indirectly benefited by less absenteeism and better employee relations.
5 Industrial Commission v. Messinger, note 3 supra (statute required all persons engaged in the handling of food to be examined); Jefferson Printing Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 312 Ill. 575, 144 N.E. 356 (1924) (employer acted in response to a request
from the commissioner of public health); Krout v. J. L. Hudson Co., 200 -Mich. 287, 166
N.W. 848 (1918); Smith v. Seamless Rubber Co., 111 Conn. 365, 150 A. 110 (1930) (employer urged bis employees to submit to a vaccination which was requested by the board
of health). See annotation, 69 A.L.R. 863 (1930). See also 1 LARSON, WoRKMEN's Co111PENSATION LAW §27.32, p. 416 (1952). Contra, Neudeck v. Ford Motor Co., 249 Mich.
690, 229 N.W. 438 (1930), where, as in the Krout case, the employer strongly urged bis
employees to submit to a vaccination at the request of the board of health. However,
this case was distinguished from the Krout case on the basis that the company's physician
had administered the vaccination rather than a public agency, and that there was less
pressure on the employer to comply-a distinction of dubious validity.
6 Krout v. J. L. Hudson Co., note 5 supra. Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, note 3 supra,
in which the court reviewed the authorities and reaffirmed the application of the "original
impetus" test. See I LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §27.32, P· 417 (1952).
7 See Krout v. J. L. Hudson Co., note 5 supra, for this type of fact situation. In
these circumstances the "original impetus" and "causal relation" tests would bring the
same result.
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of the general public and there is a better chance that he will submit if
efforts are channeled through his employer. The proposed test is not unique
in this area. It has been applied in the analogous so-called "public service"
cases where an employee is injured while pursuing an activity which is
not within the usual scope of his employment but required of him by
public law. In those cases the courts have held that if his employment was
responsible for his being subjected to the law which required him to
perform the public service, then injuries arising out of that public service
would be compensable.8 For example, where a taxicab driver, under his
statutory duty, drove in pursuit of a criminal when ordered to do so by
the police, and was injured during the chase, such injury was held compensable.9 The court reasoned that the driver's particular employment
required his driving on the public streets where he would be in constant
danger of being ordered by the police to drive in pursuit of criminals. The
causal relation between the nature of his employment and the public
service from which the injury arose rendered the injury compensable.
This "causal relation" test, if applied to the facts of the principal case,
would have resulted in compensation since the Wasserman test was undoubtedly required because of the nature of the employment-the relatively
great danger that a diseased dairy worker could infect the public through
the handled milk.

Michael M. Lyons

SSee Egan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 116 N.E. (2d) 844 (1954), where the court quotes
with approval, "The inquiry has been whether his employment exposed •him to the
risk, whatever it was, which actually caused the injury." See 1 LARSON, "\VoRKMEN's
COMPENSATION LAW §28.32, p. 441 (1952).
9 Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928).

